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Abstract. A well-known challenge for accounts of exhaustivity implications is the granularity
problem: that adding a non-weakest disjunct to an utterance (e.g., “or both”) may prevent ex-
haustivity implications. Recent approaches to this problem apply exhaustivity operators either
globally, i.e., to the disjunction as a whole, or locally, i.e., to each disjunct separately. This
paper seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the operators employed in the globalist
strand, which, contrary to globalists’ aims, have not thus far been given any sort of pragmatic
motivation. To that end this paper demonstrates that these operators can be derived, wholly or
in part, from a pragmatic theory: Attentional Pragmatics (Westera, 2017). The theory centers
on the assumption that speakers should not only assert all relevant propositions they hold true,
but also draw attention to all relevant propositions they consider possible. This assumption,
suitably formalized, overcomes the granularity problem. The current paper formally derives an
exhaustivity operator from Attentional Pragmatics and proves that it is in important respects
conservative with regard to existing operators.
Keywords: exhaustivity, Hurford disjunction, granularity, Attentional Pragmatics, globalism/localism,
innocent exclusion, minimal worlds.
1. Introduction
Adding a non-weakest disjunct can affect the exhaustivity implications of an utterance:
(1) A: Who (of John, Mary and Bill) is at the party?
a. B: John is there. (implied: not Mary, not Bill)
b. B: John is there, or both John and Mary. (implied: not Mary, not Bill)
This poses a challenge for traditional pragmatic accounts of exhaustivity, which are based on
considerations of informational strength, i.e., the Gricean maxim of Quantity (e.g., Horn 1972;
Gazdar 1979; Schulz and Van Rooij 2006; Spector 2007; Geurts 2011). The reason is that
considerations of informational strength alone are arguably unable to distinguish between ex-
amples like (1a) and (1b). After all, the most straightforward semantic informational contents
(i.e., literal sentence meanings) and hence primary informational intents (i.e., speaker mean-
ings) for (1a) and (1b) would correspond to the classical meanings of their closest translations
into predicate logic, P j and P j∨ (P j∧Pm) – but these are classically (informationally) equiv-
alent. I will call this the granularity problem: the traditional, information-based pragmatic
approach is too coarse-grained to see the difference between (1a) and (1b).
The granularity problem was noted already by Gazdar (1979), and several approaches have
been explored. Gazdar tried to solve it by assuming that utterances have “clausal” implica-
tions, to the effect that a speaker should be uncertain about any embedded clause of an uttered
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sentence, e.g., the disjuncts of a disjunction. However, besides overgenerating clausal impli-
cations, the pragmatic explanation for clausal implications relies on the assumption that both
embedded clauses and their negations are always relevant, a type of symmetry that is not plau-
sible (Horn, 1989) and that leads to the well-known symmetry problem (Kroch, 1972). More
recent approaches can be divided into two main branches:
• Localist: exhaustivity operators are applied to each disjunct (e.g., Chierchia et al. 2012),
potentially motivated pragmatically by considerations of redundancy (e.g., Katzir and
Singh 2013; Ciardelli and Roelofsen 2016).
• Globalist: an exhaustivity operator is applied only globally, to the disjunction as a whole,
but the operator is a more sophisticated one that somehow has access to the individual
disjuncts (Schulz and Van Rooij 2006; Alonso-Ovalle 2008). No pragmatic motivation
for these operators has been given.
The current paper aims to mend the gap in the globalist approaches, by outlining a pragmatic
motivation for an adequate exhaustivity operator. To that end I adopt the theory of Attentional
Pragmatics (Westera 2017), which defines a set of maxims that govern not only information
sharing, but also attention sharing – a promising approach because while (1a) and (1b) are
informationally equivalent, they are arguably attentionally distinct.
The theory of Attentional Pragmatics is summarized in section 2; section 3 derives a new
exhaustivity operator from this theory; and section 4 demonstrates its (partial) conservativeness
with regard to existing operators. Section 5 concludes.
2. Attentional Pragmatics (summary of Westera 2017)
2.1. Framework and formalism
For a clear exposition it is necessary that I summarize the conceptual and formal pragmatic
framework adopted in Westera 2017. A core assumption is the following:
Assumption 1. Speakers have certain communicative intentions, e.g., to share a piece of
information, the objects of which are called “intents”.
Intents are to be distinguished from the (semantic) contents of a sentence. This distinction is
adopted from Bach and Harnish 1979, and it generalizes Grice’s (1989) distinction between
speaker meaning and sentence meaning. In this paper I will say only very little about semantic
contents; I will just presuppose that an adequate semantics exists which, through the maxim of
Manner, delivers the assumed intents. Another core assumption is the following:
Assumption 2. A goal of making a certain piece of information common ground is not
pursued on its own, but as part of what is called a “theme”: a set of propositions that share
a certain subject matter and that each ought to be made common ground.
Themes are more commonly called “questions under discussion”, but this gives rise to a poten-
tially harmful confusion between questions as discourse goals, as utterances, as meanings of
interrogative sentences and as meanings of embedded interrogative-like constructions.
The assumed intents and themes for the relevant examples, as well as the conversational max-
ims, will be specified in Intensional Logic (Montague, 1973), albeit with doxastic rather than
alethic modality and with some additional notation conventions. I refer to the exposition in
Gamut 1991 (vol.2) for the basic formalism. As a brief reminder: the operators ∧ and ∨ signify
abstraction over and application to worlds, which will be used in this paper almost exclusively
to switch between propositions and their truth values, i.e., ∧ϕ can generally be read as “(the
proposition) that ϕ”, and ∨p as “the proposition p is true here”. To illustrate, the formula
(P j∧T0(∧P j)) might express that the speaker takes herself to know that John is at the party
and that the proposition that John is at the party is an element of the main theme.
As is common, expressions of certain relevant types will be distinguished typographically. Be-
sides using lowercase for individual constants/variables (a,b,c, . . . of type e) and uppercase
for predicates (A,B,C, . . . of type 〈e, t〉), I will use lowercase calligraphic constants/variables
for propositions (a,b,c, . . . of type 〈s, t〉) and uppercase calligraphic for sets of propositions
(A,B,C, . . . of type 〈〈s, t〉, t〉). Furthermore, as a notational convention, for all unary, first-order
predicate constants P, I may write, e.g., P jmb to mean P j∧Pm∧Pb. In addition, it will occa-
sionally be convenient to conceive of functions of type 〈a, t〉 as sets of things of type a, and to
use the usual set-theoretical operations and relations within the object language (these can be
defined as mere notational shorthands; Zimmermann 1989). Lastly, for any set-type expression
X I will write X∩ to mean the closure of X under intersection.
In order to formalize the theory, type-theoretical expressions will be interpreted on a subclass
of admissible models, designed so as to interpret certain constants in a certain way, e.g., the
constant I-RELATION will be interpreted basically as the Gricean maxim of (I(nformational)-
)Relation (cf. Montague’s meaning postulates). Admissible models must also validate the
KD45 belief axioms, plus intent introspection and theme introspection, which ensure that the
speaker knows the interpretations of constants denoting intents and themes of the utterance
(e.g., p0 for the main informational intent, i.e., what is asserted) – I leave their definitions
implicit. Thus:
Definition 1 (Admissible model). A model M (or 〈M,w0〉) is an admissible model iff:
1. M validates (makes true in all its worlds) the KD45 belief axioms;
2. M validates intent and theme introspection; and
3. M validates the definitions of the maxims, to be given below.
And it is an admissible model for a given example if, and only if, in addition:
4. w0 validates all formal statements given in the example (in a gray box); and
5. W is sufficiently large, namely, every contingent first-order formula, that can be con-
structed from only constants used in the example, variables, connectives and quanti-










Figure 1: The theme and attentional intents of (2a), (2b) and (2c).
Admissible models for a given example enable us to instantly formalize the relevant parts of a
given example and prove potentially interesting things about it, e.g., that an utterance complies
with the Gricean maxim of Relation, which is the case if in all admissible models for the
example the constant I-RELATION returns true in the actual world, when applied to the relevant
intents and themes, and given the beliefs and goals of the speaker.
On top of the common assumption that utterances have themes and intents, we need a particular
type of intent to solve the granularity problem (building on Ciardelli et al. 2009):
Assumption 3. Utterances have attentional intents. An attentional intent is a non-empty
set of propositions to which a speaker intends to draw the audience’s attention.
Note that an utterance may draw attention to many things, propositions and otherwise, including
(but not limited to) everything explicitly mentioned in the utterance – but not everything will be
part of what the speaker intended to draw attention to, i.e., part of the attentional intent. Note
furthermore that the assumption that utterances have attentional intents does not commit one
to the assumption of a corresponding dimension of attentional semantic content. In Westera
2017 it is shown that attentional intents can typically be clearly conveyed without such an
enriched semantic dimension, simply on the basis of the informational contents of all uttered
constituents.
To illustrate, and also to get acquainted with the formalism, let us consider the intents and
themes of (1) with which this chapter started, repeated here as (2):
(2) a. A: Who (of John, Mary and Bill) is at the party?
T0 = {∧P j,∧Pm,∧Pb}∩ A0 = {∧P j,∧Pm,∧Pb}∩
b. B: John is at the party.
T0 = {∧P j,∧Pm,∧Pb}∩ p0 = ∧P j A0 = {∧P j}
c. B: John is at the party, or John and Mary.
T0 = {∧P j,∧Pm,∧Pb}∩ p0 = ∧P j A0 = {∧P j,∧P jm}
For each utterance T0 denotes the main theme, p0 the main informational intent (what is as-
serted) and A0 the main attentional intent. Recall that {...}∩ is a notational shorthand for
closure under intersection. For independent motivation of the assumed themes and intents I
refer to Westera 2017. The assumed attentional intents of (2a), (2b) and (2c) are depicted, from
left to right, in figure 1. This type of pictorial representation will be relied upon again further
below. In it, each attentional intent is depicted as a Venn diagram on the set of all possible
worlds, based on the three atomic propositions of John’s, Mary’s, and Bill’s presence (the cir-
cles). Overlapping propositions in the attentional intent – the gray regions – are pulled apart in
a third dimension, towards the reader as it were, for clearer presentation.
2.2. Maxims governing informational intents
The maxims are defined, recall, by fixing the interpretation of a number of designated constants
in the class of admissible models. The I(nformation)-maxims closely resemble Grice’s (1989,
ch.2) maxims (except Manner, which will not play an explicit role in this paper). Grice’s
informal approach can of course be formalized in different ways, and for a motivation of the
following definition I refer to Westera 2017 (e.g., it predicts the right distribution of intonational
cues of maxim violations; cf. Westera 2013):
Definition 2.
1. I-QUALITY(p) =∨p
“Intend to share only information you take to be true.”
2. I-RELATION(p,T ) = T (p)
“Intend to share only information that is thematic.”





→ (p ⊆ q)
)
“Intend to share all thematic information you take to be true.”
From this definition we can derive some general results, e.g., that a speaker will always know
whether a given intent complies with the I-maxims or not, and that if there exists a compliant
intent then it is the only one. We can also compute more concrete predictions, e.g.:
Fact 1. For all admissible models 〈M,w0〉 for example (2b):
M,w0 |= I-QUANTITY(p0,T0)→ (¬Pm∧¬Pb)
This I-Quantity implication is the starting point of traditional pragmatic accounts of exhaustiv-
ity implications. However, since it is (correctly) predicted for (2b) and (2c) alike, it does not
provide us with a handle for distinguishing them – this is the granularity problem. Note, further-
more, that the absence of belief (¬Pm) does not entail a belief to the contrary (¬Pm), i.e.,
exhaustivity. This is the well-known epistemic step, which elsewhere I have argued is a genuine
empirical problem for the standard, I-Quantity-based recipe for exhaustivity (Westera 2014).
2.3. Maxims governing attentional intents
The A(ttention)-maxims follow the same general recipe as the I-maxims, except for the addition
of the maxim of A-Parsimony, which I will briefly motivate shortly:
Definition 3.
1. A-QUALITY(A) = ∀a(A(a)→ ♦∨a)
“Intend to draw attention only to propositions that you consider possible.”
2. A-RELATION(A,T ) = ∀a(A(a)→T (a))












“Intend to draw attention to a proposition only if, if you consider it possible, you con-
sider it possible independently of any more specific thematic proposition(s).”





“Intend to draw att. to all thematic propositions you consider independently possi-
ble.”
Again some general results can be proven, e.g., that a speaker will always know whether the
A-maxims are complied with, and that if there is a compliant attentional intent then it is the
only one. As on the informational side, for a motivation of this particular definition of the
maxims I refer to Westera 2017. I will here summarize only the motivation for A-Parsimony.
Consider a speaker B who believes that if John and Mary are at the party, then so is Bill (i.e.,
(P jm→ Pb)). Now, consider the following two utterances made by this speaker:
(3) a. B: John is at the party, or John, Mary and Bill.
(P jm→ Pb)
T0 = {∧P j,∧Pm,∧Pb}∩ A0 = {∧P j,∧P jmb} p0 = ∧P j
b. (?) B: John is there, or John and Mary, or John, Mary and Bill.
(P jm→ Pb)
T0 = {∧P j,∧Pm,∧Pb}∩ A0 = {∧P j,∧P jm,∧P jmb} p0 = ∧P j
I take it that the utterance in (3b) is intuitively quite strange: why, given B’s beliefs, did B
include the middle disjunct – or, in terms of attentional intents, why did B intend to draw atten-
tion to John and Mary’s joint presence (∧P jm)? The maxim of A-Parsimony predicts precisely
this strangeness: drawing attention to John and Mary’s joint presence is not parsimonious, i.e.,
superfluous, because B does not consider it possible independently of the presence of all three












Figure 2: The theme, attentional intents and and exhaustivity implications of (2b) and (2c).
either A-Quality, if ∧P jmb is not in fact considered possible, or A-Parsimony, if it is and ∧P jm
is not possible independently of it. In contrast, for (3a) there does exist an admissible model in
which all the maxims are complied with.
3. Deriving an exhaustivity operator
I will first apply the maxims to some concrete examples, before presenting a general result and
a derivative exhaustivity operator. Consider once again the contrast with which this chapter
started, with the assumed themes and intents as given in (2), repeated here:
(2) a. A: Who (of John, Mary and Bill) is at the party?
T0 = {∧P j,∧Pm,∧Pb}∩ A0 = {∧P j,∧Pm,∧Pb}∩
b. B: John is at the party.
T0 = {∧P j,∧Pm,∧Pb}∩ p0 = ∧P j A0 = {∧P j}
c. B: John is at the party, or John and Mary.
T0 = {∧P j,∧Pm,∧Pb}∩ p0 = ∧P j A0 = {∧P j,∧P jm}
The exhaustivity implication we wish to derive for (2b) is that B believes that Mary and Bill are
not at the party (¬Pm, ¬Pb). For (2c) we want to derive the same for Bill (¬Pb), but not
for Mary – with regard to Mary we may want to derive merely that the speaker does not consider
Mary’s presence possible independently of John’s ((Pm→ P j)). The desired implications are
depicted schematically in figure 2, which is identical to figure 1 given earlier except for the bold
outlines, which contain those worlds that the exhaustivity implications would exclude from the
speaker’s doxastic state. Formally, exhaustivity follows from the assumption that B takes her
attentional intent to comply with A-Quantity (A-QUANTITY(A0,T0)). That is, for (2b), as
depicted in figure 2(b), we get:









Figure 3: The theme, attentional intent and exhaustivity implication of example (4).
And for (2c), as depicted in figure 2(c), we get:
Fact 3. For all admissible models 〈M,w0〉 for (2c):
M,w0 |=A-QUANTITY(A0,T0)→ (¬Pb∧(Pm→ P jm))
And there exists such a model where:
M,w0 6|=A-QUANTITY(A0,T0)→¬Pm
Instead, for all admissible models for (2c) we have:
M,w0 |=A-QUALITY(A0)→¬¬Pm
Here the implication that Mary’s presence is not possible independently of John’s ((Pm→
P jm)) derives from A-Quantity’s conditioning on A-Parsimony: B didn’t draw attention to
Mary’s presence, so she must not consider it possible independently of John and Mary’s joint
presence. But note that, in this case, the same can be inferred from I-Quality: believing that
John is at the party (P j) entails believing that he is if Mary is ((Pm→ P jm)). Thus, for
(2c) A-Parsimony is not strictly necessary. But it does make a difference for the variant in (3a)
given earlier, repeated here in (4) (though without the particular beliefs):
(4) B: John is at the party, or John, Mary and Bill.
T0 = {∧P j,∧Pm,∧Pb}∩ p0 = ∧P j A0 = {∧P j,∧P jmb}
Figure 3(a) and (b) depict the assumed theme and the attentional intent, in which the bold
outline again contains those worlds excluded by the exhaustivity implication from B’s doxastic
state. The implication is that, according to B, Mary or Bill can be at the party only if everyone
is. Unlike before, this implication follows from A-Quantity and not from I-Quality (since ∨P j
does not entail (Pm→ P jmb)). Hence, A-Parsimony does occasionally make a difference.
To derive a more general result, let us restrict our attention to cases where the theme has the
property of chain completeness, which means that for every chain of ever more specific, the-
matic propositions, their infinitary intersection is also thematic. The role of this restriction is
clarified in the proof in the appendix. The following result obtains:
Fact 4. For all admissible models M, for arbitrary constants Ai and T j, where the theme
denoted by T j is chain-complete:




(¬∨a ∨∃b(Ai(b)∧ (b ⊂ a)∧ ∨b))
)
And if in M the speaker’s beliefs are accurate (factivity), then:




(¬∨a ∨∃b(Ai(b)∧ (b ⊂ a)∧ ∨b))
)
In words: compliance with A-Quantity implies that, for every proposition that is thematic and
to which no attention is intended to be drawn, the speaker must think that it does not obtain or
that, if it does obtain, a more specific proposition obtains to which attention is intended to be
drawn.
We can define a notational shorthand for the second result of fact 4, namely by taking its
intension (∧), while making sure through abstraction and application that the intent and theme
constants are interpreted in the initial world of evaluation. We then get:
Definition 4. For A and T any constant or variable of type 〈〈s, t〉, t〉, let the following
notational shorthand be defined:










Note that this exhaustivity operator is not a substantive assumption of the theory, but a mere
notational shorthand for the exhaustivity implications that are predicted by the theory anyway,
at least in admissible models, given factivity and compliance with A-Quantity. The operator can
also be formulated in the metalanguage, in a more set-theoretical fashion (parameters M,w,g
for the interpretation function [.], omitted for readability, are the same throughout):










This obtains fairly directly, and I will omit a formal proof: the universal quantifier in definition 4
corresponds here to generalized intersection; negation to complementation, disjunction to union
and existential quantification to generalized union. To illustrate, notice that the complements
of the bold outlines in figures 2 and 3 given earlier correspond precisely to the sets of worlds
characterized by the exhaustivity operator, when applied to the relevant themes and intents.
...K0 K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6
(a)
...K0 K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6
(b)
Figure 4: The theme and attentional intent (with exhaustivity implication) of (5B).
To illustrate the operator, let us consider a slightly more elaborate example:
(5) A: How many kids does John have?
B: John has one, three, or five kids.
T0 = {∧K0,∧K1,∧K2,∧K3,∧K4, . . .} A0 = {∧K1,∧K3,∧K5}
p0 = ∧K1 (equivalent to ∧(K1∨K3∨K5))
I assume an “at least”-interpretation of numerals for the sake of illustration (the structure of
interest can be replicated without numerals). The theme and the attentional intent of (5B)
are depicted in figure 4. The striped regions together contain the worlds that are excluded by
the operator (like the bold outlines before). The outcome of the operator can be computed as
follows, now writing bare numerals n as a shorthand for ∧Kn:
EXH(A0,T0)=(0∪1∪3∪5) ∩ (2∪3∪5) ∩ (4∪5) ∩6∩7∩ . . .
= 1 ∩ (2∪3) ∩ (4∪5) ∩6
=(1∩2∩4∩6)∪ . . .∪(1∩3∩4∩6)∪ . . .∪(1∩3∩5∩6)
= (1∩2) ∪ (3∩4) ∪ (5∩6)
The last line says that John has exactly one, exactly three, or exactly five kids.
4. (Partial) conservativeness with regard to existing operators
The current exhaustivity operator is motivated pragmatically. In contrast, existing operators
tend to have been motivated either only descriptively (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984; Alonso-
Ovalle, 2008) or, in part, in terms of I-Quantity (as in Schulz and Van Rooij 2006; Spector
2007); and sometimes they are conceived of as grammatical devices (e.g., Fox, 2007; Chierchia
et al., 2012; Katzir and Singh, 2013). Different motivations may justify different applications
of the operator, and hence lead to different empirical predictions even if the operators would be
equivalent when regarded purely as abstract mathematical objects. Nevertheless, let us compare
the current operator to previous ones at this abstract, mathematical level. I will consider three
operators:
1. the minimal worlds operator EXHmw discussed in Spector 2016 (attributed to Spector
2007 and Schulz and Van Rooij 2006);
2. the innocent exclusion operator EXHie from Alonso-Ovalle 2008 (based on the notion of
innocent exclusion from Fox 2007); and
3. the dynamic operator EXHdyn from Schulz and Van Rooij 2006.
I will also discuss the grammatical approach, which applies an operator like EXHmw to each
disjunct separately. Correspondences between these operators and the current one will be stated
only for cases in which (i) application of the current operator is warranted, and (ii) the other
operator was intended to apply. Condition (i) is satisfied in operable models:
Definition 5 (Operable model). An admissible model 〈M,w0〉 is operable if and only if the
speaker’s beliefs are accurate (factivity), in w0 the relevant intents comply with the maxims
relative to the relevant themes, and the set of thematic propositions in w0 is chain-complete.
Although I will state (partial) correspondences to each of the aforementioned operators, for
reasons of space a proof will be given (in the appendix) only for the third.
First, the minimal worlds operator (Schulz and Van Rooij, 2006; Spector, 2007, 2016) can
be defined in the current framework by temporarily adding EXHmw to the language, with the
following semantics (as before, the omitted parameters of [.] are the same everywhere):
Definition 6. For arbitrary constants/variables p and T , let:
[EXHmw(p,T )]
def
= {w ∈ [p] | there is no w′ ∈ [p] such that:
{a | a ∈ [T ],w′ ∈ a} ⊂ {a | a ∈ [T ],w ∈ a}}
That is, the proposition denoted by p must be true in the relevant worlds w, together with a set of
other thematic propositions that is minimal compared to the sets of true thematic propositions
in other worlds w′ in which the proposition denoted by p is true. The minimal worlds operator
aligns with the current operator if the attentional intent is a singleton set:
Fact 6. Take any utterance with intents denoted by pi and A j such that A j = {pi} is true,
and theme denoted by Tk. For any admissible, operable model 〈M,w0〉 for such an utter-
ance: M,w0 |= EXHmw(pi,Tk) = pi∩EXH(A j,Tk)
This result shows that the operators align when attention does not really make a difference.
I refer to Spector 2016 for a detailed comparison of the operator EXHmw to other existing
operators from Krifka 1993 and Fox 2007. None of these operators can distinguish between
(1a) and (1b) with which this chapter started – this is the granularity problem.
Second, the innocent exclusion operator of Alonso-Ovalle (2008) is formulated in terms of
Alternative Semantics, but it can be readily applied to attentional intents. It relies on a set IE
of innocently excludable propositions, a notion adopted from Fox 2007:
Definition 7. For A a set of propositions, and A∩ its closure under intersection, let:
IE(A) def= {a∈A∩ | for all b ∈ A, any way of excluding from b as many
a′∈A∩ as consistency allows, excludes also a}
In terms of innocent exclusion, the operator is defined as follows:









This operator aligns with the current one with regard to (1a) and (1b) (i.e., (2b,c)). However,
for the variant “John, or John, Mary and Bill” in (4) it fails to predict exhaustivity. One problem
is that Alonso-Ovalle does not derive the theme from some preceding question, but computes
it from the utterance itself by taking the set of disjuncts and closing this set under intersection.
A more serious problem is that his operator never excludes part of a proposition, like in (4)
the part of the proposition denoted by ∧P jm that is not contained in the proposition denoted by
∧P jmb – after all, a proposition is not “innocently excludable” if it contains a proposition that
isn’t. Still, for a restricted set of cases our operators are formally equivalent:




• Tk =A∩j ; and
• ∀a((Tk(a)∧¬A j(a))→¬∃b(b ⊂ a ∧A j(b))).
For any admissible, operable model 〈M,w0〉 for such an utterance:
M,w0 |= EXHie(A j) = (pi∩EXH(A j,Tk))
The third bullet excludes cases like (4), where mere parts of propositions need to be excluded.
Third, the dynamic operator EXHdyn of Schulz and Van Rooij 2006 is in a way a modification
of the “minimal worlds” operator EXHmw, the difference being that EXHdyn does not minimize
the set of true thematic propositions among all worlds in the informational intent, but only
within certain subsets. I will bypass the details of how they determine these subsets, a matter
for which they use dynamic semantics – in a nutshell, they compare only world-assignment
pairs that share the same assignment (discourse referents). At least for disjunctive utterances,
which they assume introduce a discourse referent for each disjunct, this amounts simply to
comparing only worlds within some proposition in the attentional intent. Hence, for present
purposes their operator can be (re)defined as follows:
Definition 9. For arbitrary constants/variables A, and T , let:
[EXHdyn(A,T )] = {w | for some a ∈ [A]: w∈a and there is no w′∈a
s.t. {b |b ∈ [T ],w′∈b} ⊂ {b | b∈ [T ],w∈b}}
Whether this definition corresponds exactly to theirs depends on the degree to which the current
attentional intents align with what they consider to be discourse referents – a matter which I
defer to Westera 2017. But as it is defined here the operator EXHdyn can distinguish between
(1a) and (1b), as well as account for (4) – indeed, our operators align quite generally:
Fact 8. Take any utterance with intents denoted by pi and A j and a theme denoted by Tk,




• Tk = T ∩k .
For any admissible, operable model 〈M,w0〉 for such an utterance:
M,w0 |= EXHdyn(A j,Tk) = (pi∩EXH(A j,Tk))
This highlights that the contribution of this paper is not the exhaustivity operator in itself but its
derivation from Attentional Pragmatics. In contrast, Schulz and Van Rooij offer only a partial
explanation for their operator – they do not motivate its sensitivity to discourse referents, which
is precisely what gives it an edge over the other operators. The part which they do motivate
(basically EXHmw) relies on I-Quantity, and hence runs into the granularity problem.
Lastly, let us consider the grammatical approach to exhaustivity, which assumes that op-
erators like EXHmw are covertly applied to each disjunct separately. The dynamic operator
EXHdyn, by virtue of its definition, effectively “exhaustifies” each individual disjunct in a sim-
ilar fashion. Hence, fact 8 entails a correspondence also between the current operator (as well
as EXHdyn) and the grammatical approach. Nevertheless, Attentional Pragmatics doesn’t pre-
dict, unlike the grammatical approach, that individual disjuncts are interpreted exhaustively.
Roughly, the difference between our approaches can be paraphrased as follows:
(6) B: John, or John, Mary and Bill.
a. Grammatical approach: John and no one else was there, or John, Mary and Bill.
(P j∧¬Pm∧¬Pb)∨P jmb)
b. Attentional Pragmatics: John was there, or John, Mary and Bill – and if Mary or
Bill was there then everyone was. ((P j∨P jmb)∧ ((Pm∨Pb)→ P jmb))
Although the two paraphrases (and formulae) are classically, informationally equivalent, only
(6a) involves the exhaustive interpretation of an individual disjunct. What this shows is that
some at first sight “local” exhaustivity effects can be predicted by a globalist pragmatic theory
– of course provided it is sensitive to some dimension of speaker meaning that, while global, re-
flects the syntactic structure of the uttered sentence more closely than informational intents do
(cf. Simons 2011). This doesn’t mean that Attentional Pragmatics can account for all purport-
edly local exhaustivity effects – such effects may well be a mixed bag (Geurts, 2011). Nor does
a formal correspondence mean that Attentional Pragmatics and the grammatical approach make
the same predictions – this depends, after all, on where and when the grammatical approach
predicts that operators be inserted, and what their sets of formal alternatives are.
Several proponents of the grammatical approach have proposed that local exhaustification is
driven by considerations of redundancy (e.g., Katzir and Singh 2013; essentially following
Hurford 1974). They note that, in cases like (6), the stronger disjunct does not contribute to the
information conveyed by the utterance unless the weaker disjunct is interpreted exhaustively.
However, as Ciardelli and Roelofsen (2016) demonstrate, this explanation may fail when one’s
semantics/pragmatics is more fine-grained than the traditional, information-only picture: for
instance, constituents that are informationally redundant can still make an attentional differ-
ence. Indeed, according to Attentional Pragmatics the second disjunct in (6) isn’t redundant,
and as a consequence this theory is incompatible with redundancy-based accounts of local ex-
haustification in such disjunctions. Note that this doesn’t mean that redundancy has no role to
play in pragmatics. For one, informational redundancy may still play a role in conjunctions
where one conjunct entails the other (because from I-Quality and A-Parsimony it follows that
the attentional intent may rationally contain only the conjunction as a whole). Moreover, the
maxim of A-Parsimony essentially bans an attentional kind of redundancy.
5. Discussion
According to Attentional Pragmatics, exhaustivity implications arise not from the assumption
that a rational speaker asserts all thematic propositions believed to be true, nor from local
exhaustification driven by considerations of redundancy, but from the assumption that a ra-
tional speaker draws attention to all thematic propositions believed to be possible. This new
perspective provides a globalist pragmatic solution to the granularity problem, one which the
current paper captured in an operator. It also solves several other problems for the standard,
information-based approach; I refer to Westera 2017 for an application to the occurrence of
exhaustivity in cases where I-Quantity does not apply (hints, questions) and cases where the
opinionatedness assumption is explicitly denied, as well as a solution to the symmetry problem.
If valid, this attentional approach mandates a thorough revision of the literature on exhaustivity.
At a purely technical level, the current paper may seem to suggest that the required revision is
rather minimal: the operator derived from Attentional Pragmatics is, as a purely formal device,
in important respects conservative with regard to operators from the literature. However, the
range of circumstances in which its application is pragmatically warranted is more restricted
than the frequent reliance on exhaustivity operators in the literature seems to require. It ex-
cludes, for instance, the local operators that grammaticalists assume, but also certain global
occurrences. For instance, Schulz and Van Rooij (2006) seek to apply their operator directly to
conditional answers to unconditional questions, and to modalized answers to non-modalized
questions, but these are cases for which in the current approach no “operable” admissible
models exist: conditional/modal answers cannot compliantly address the theme introduced by
unconditional/non-modal questions, hence we must not seek to directly apply our operator to
them. These cases must be analyzed, rather, as involving a theme shift, to be explained by a
separate “theme pragmatics” (Westera, 2017), i.e., a theory of how conversational goals are
prioritized and organized into themes. The current maxims, in contrast, constrain only which
intentions are rational given a theme, i.e., a set of goals.
More generally, the restrictions on the current operator’s applicability reflect that it abbreviates
only a rather small part of a pragmatic theory. The operator of Schulz and Van Rooij seems
more ambitious; they motivate it by stating that “none of these [previously proposed] theories
gives a satisfying explanation for why the scope of exhaustive interpretation should be restricted
to those cases that they can actually handle” (p.8). But the converse is true as well: none of
these existing theories, including Schulz and Van Rooij’s, gives a satisfying explanation for
why the cases that their operators appear to handle are cases that they should handle. If all
you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail (e.g., Maslow, 1966). By acknowledging
the limited applicability of the current exhaustivity operator, and the unknown applicability of
existing ones, we may begin to see subtle differences between different types of exhaustivity-
like inferences, and between the types of conversational goals that are normally served by
conditional and unconditional answers or plain and modalized answers.
Appendix. Proofs of facts 4 and 8
Proof of fact 4: Take an arbitrary admissible model M in which T j complies with the chain
completeness restriction. Take an arbitrary world w in this model. Suppose that the speaker
takes A-Quantity to be complied with, i.e., M,w |=A-QUANTITY(Ai,T j). Given intent and






Take an arbitrary function g that assigns to a a thematic proposition, i.e., suppose that:
M,w,g |= T j(a) (2)
Suppose, furthermore, that no attention is drawn to a in w:
M,w,g |= ¬Ai(a) (3)
Since Ai(a) is false in w, the antecedent in (1) cannot be true either, hence at least one of its
conjuncts must be false. A-Relation cannot be blamed, because the proposition denoted by a
is thematic in w (from supposition (2)), so it must be either A-Quality or A-Parsimony. Let us
explore the latter.
Suppose that the singleton intent denoted by {a} does not comply with A-Parsimony in w, i.e.,
M,w,g |= ¬A-PARSIMONY({a},T0). This amounts to:
M,w,g |= ♦∨a ∧(∨a→∃b (b ⊂ a ∧T0(b)∧ ∨b)) (4)
It follows that there exists a world w′ that is belief-accessible from w, such that the proposition
assigned to a is true in w′, and, by the second conjunct, some stronger proposition can be
assigned to b that is true and thematic in w′. This means that in the original world w, the
proposition assigned to b must be considered possible and, by theme introspection, thematic.
Hence, we have:
M,w,g |= ∃b(b ⊂ a ∧T0(b)∧♦∨b)
Since this stronger proposition b is thematic and possible, A-Quantity (which is complied with
according to (1)) requires that it be an element of the attentional intent denoted by Ai in w,
unless A-Parsimony prevents this, i.e., unless there is an even stronger thematic and possible
proposition (say, c), independently of which b in turn is not considered possible. And so on,
potentially ad infinitum.
To curb this potential infinitude, assume that the set of thematic propositions is chain-complete,
i.e., that for every chain of increasingly specific thematic propositions a0,a1, . . . (i.e., such that
every ai+1 ⊂ ai), their infinitary intersection
⋂
{a0,a1, . . .} is also thematic. This guarantees
that there exists a maximally specific thematic and possible proposition, and according to A-
Quantity that must be an element of the attentional intent denoted by Ai. This means that we
can strengthen supposition (4) by adding the conjunctAi(b), which after dropping the conjunct
T0(b) yields the following:
M,w,g |= ♦∨a ∧(∨a→∃b (b ⊂ a ∧Ai(b)∧ ∨b))
This was derived, recall, from the supposition that the singleton intent denoted by {a} does
not comply with A-Parsimony in w, i.e., that A-Parsimony is the reason why the proposition
assigned to a is not an element of the attentional intent denoted byAi. The other possible reason
was A-Quality, i.e., ¬♦∨a. Hence, we can conclude the disjunction of these two reasons:
M,w,g |= ¬♦∨a ∨ (♦∨a ∧(∨a→∃b (b ⊂ a ∧Ai(b)∧ ∨b)))
which implies: M,w,g |=(¬∨a ∨∃b (b ⊂ a ∧Ai(b)∧ ∨b))




(¬∨a ∨∃b(Ai(b)∧b ⊂ a ∧ ∨b))
)
And by retracting supposition (1), i.e., that A-Quantity is (believed to be) complied with, we
obtain the first result in fact 4. The second result directly derives from this through factivity.
The restriction to chain-complete themes is only a presentational choice, that allows a simpler
formulation of the main result. It is not indicative of, say, some sort of defect in the maxims. I
don’t think that, relative to a theme like that is not chain-complete, a speaker could rationally
behave differently from what the current maxims predict, namely, to not draw attention to
any particular proposition in the chain. If anything, a rational speaker may want to consider
switching to a chain-complete theme instead.
Proof of fact 8: We prove the equivalence of the two operators by proving inclusion right-
to-left and then left-to-right. First right-to-left: in an arbitrary admissible, operable model
〈M,w0〉 of the specified type of utterance, take a world w ∈ [pi ∩ EXH(A j,Tk)]M,w0,g. Given
that pi =
⋃
A j is true in w0, there must be some a ∈ [A j]M,w0,g such that w ∈ a. Moreover,
given the chain-completeness restriction on themes in operable models, and given compliance
with A-Relation, there must be a most specific (strongest, smallest) proposition a of that sort.
From our exhaustivity operator it follows that every thematic proposition to which no attention
is drawn is either false in w, or entailed by this most specific a. Hence, w makes the proposition
a true and anything entailed by it, but no other thematic propositions. Within a, then, there is
no w′ ∈ a where the set of true thematic propositions is smaller than in w. Hence (by definition)
w ∈ [EXHdyn(A j,Tk)]M,w0,g.
Conversely, take an arbitrary world w ∈ [EXHdyn(A j,Tk)]M,w0,g. According to the definition of
EXHdyn, there must be some a ∈ [A j]M,w0,g such that w ∈ a and w makes a minimal number of
thematic propositions true, compared to other w′ ∈ a. Given the chain-completeness restriction
and compliance with A-Relation, there must be a most specific (strongest, smallest) a of that
sort. Within this most specific a, any minimal set of true thematic propositions will contain a
and anything entailed by it, but nothing else. (This is because, if a minimal set of true thematic
propositions had contained another thematic proposition a′, then the intersection a∩ a′ would
have been thematic as well (by assumption of closure under intersection), and a would not have
been possible independently of these more specific intersections, contrary to A-Parsimony, and
would not have been included in the attentional intent.) Hence, this world w is contained in a,
to which attention is drawn, but in no more specific thematic proposition. By definition, my
operator contains all such worlds. Moreover, given that pi =
⋃
A j is true in w0, we have that
w ∈ [pi]M,w0,g, and hence w ∈ [pi ∩EXH(A j,Tk)]M,w0,g.
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